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~ Against Popper's view on *BELIEF*: a criticism via Searle ~
In a recent comment from a slightly older thread, John Schoenemann wrote:
>>"The fact that a basic statement counts as a falsification relies on community standards of BELIEF, that is peer review."<<
I think this re-pushes to the front of the discussion arena a problem which, although perhaps not at all new, should still concern us in the most serious manner.
Therefore, in this thread, I propose to open a discussion focused on two main questions:
1. Does Popperian falsification rely, indeed, on community standards of belief? [In fact, two sub-questions here: (1a) Does Popperian falsification rely, indeed, on COMMUNITY standards? and (1b) Are those community standards necessarily standards of BELIEF?] ;
and
2. Is belief always subjective in the epistemically dangeours sense attacked by Popper?
My (tentative) answers are as follows:
1'. YES,
and
2'. NO.
Or, in more explicit language:
1''. It does appear that each particular (claimed) successful falsification INEVITABLY relies on some COMMUNITY-based:
(a) methodological standards,
but also on
(b) (provisionally) accepted community BELIEFS.
Now, if true (as I, for one, do conjecture it is), this would seem to be a great obstacle for a philosophy like Popper's, eminently -- if not even exclusively -- interested in the growth of "OBJECTIVE knowledge".
That's because -- according to Popper's repeated contention -- beliefs are *subjective* mental states and so, allegedly, irrelevant for the project of an objectivist epistemology and philosophy of science.
But the case can be made that Popper's interpretation of the word "subjective" is much too restrictive and, thus, his thinking on this topic became needlessly confused.
To see why, it might be helpful to resort to a double distinction, developed by John R. Searle, in his 1995 vol. "The Construction of Social Reality" [http://epistemh.pbworks.com/f/6.+The+Construction+of+Social… ] -- namely, that between:
<i> ONTOLOGIC objectity/ subjectivity
and
<ii> EPISTEMIC (or, as I'd prefer to call it, REPRESENTATIONAL) objectivity/ subjectivity.
Now, I do concede Popper is right that beliefs are, indeed, subjective -- but only in an ONTOLOGICAL sense (i.e., the existence of any belief is dependent of the existence of at least one mind, who entertains it).
Nevertheless, despite beliefs being ontologically subjective, they could, in principle, be at least EPISTEMICALLY (or REPRESENTATIONALLY) OBJECTIVE -- i.e., objective in the sense that their representational CONTENT accurately corresponds to some external facts/ realities/ states-of-affairs.
So, even if what counts as a successful falsification unavoidable depends on a professional community' methodological standards AND current BELIEFS,
2''. This does NOT necessarily imply that beliefs are subjective also in their representational CONTENT.
Hence, Popper's mantra that "beliefs are (ontologically) subjective", although correct, just misses the mark.
Therefore, beliefs CAN be coherently integrated even in a philosophy interested in the production (and expansion) of "objective knowledge".
Indeed, when one rationally (i.e., tentatively and provisionally) *PREFERS* a conjecture that has, thus far, survived criticism, it could be said one rationally *BELIEVES* that the aforementioned conjecture is true (or more truth-like than its rivals).
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Any comments?
Комментарии
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John Schoenemann I agree with much of what you say. I basically am following Charles Sanders Peirce's definition of belief. It is a "rule of action". That is a belief is something that we are willing to act upon because we have no reason to doubt that it is true. This definition can apply to a community as well as an individual. On an individual level I can have a justified belief that I locked my door, if I have no reason to doubt that it is true that I locked my door. On a community level, we can also have a shared rule of action, that is how a scientific theory is held to be true. For example, it appears that the scientific community has no reason to doubt that Climate Change is occurring based on human actions. Unfortunately, due to anti scientific rules of action (beliefs) that our leaders and larger community have, there is a lot of doubt about Climate Change. Which view is likely to be more objective. We can only look at the track records of the individual communities.
You can find Peirce's writings on this topic here www.peirce.orgСкрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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Danny Frederick Beliefs are irrelevant to Popper's epistemology. A complete sceptic, like me, can follow Popper's methodological rules and contribute to the growth of knowledge. The sceptic, like others, accepts a basic statement in light of his perceptual experience. But, being a sceptic, he does not, or need not, believe the basic statement to be true. He need not believe anything about his experiences or what his experiences imply or even what his basic statements imply. He may, like me, accept classical logic because it is the easiest to comprehend and the easiest to get others to agree to; in which case he will ACCEPT (for the purpose of playing 'the game of science') that the statement implies what can be derived from it using classical logic; but he need not believe that those implications really hold.
This is not, of course, to say that only sceptics can play Popper's game of science. But the fact that sceptics CAN play it, shows the irrelevance of belief.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на негоСкрыть 17 ответов-
John Schoenemann Danny Frederick if you have any personality at all, then you have a character. What is a character? It is a set of beliefs that you are willing to act upon that can be used to define what you as a person are. What do we say when a person acts contrary to the beliefs that we take him to have? We say he is acting out of character. That is acting in conflict with his beliefs.
Anyone who has any methodological program is acting on a set of beliefs that he understand this methodological program can achieve. So beliefs are indispensible for inquiry.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него -
Danny Frederick John Schoenemann Defining 'character' to include beliefs is just an arbitrary stipulation. We all have theories that we use to make sense of the world and also theories that we act on (which may be different to the first set of theories, which may even contradict some of the first set of theories). But we do not need to believe those theories; and, in so far as we are critical/sceptical, we will not believe them, we will instead hold them as hypotheses which may be (and probably are) false, and we may even spend a good deal of our time trying to refute them or to replace them with better ones.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него -
John Schoenemann Danny Frederick, in order to do anything, you have to have a belief that your action will be successful. This also includes the act of holding on to some methodology. To hold on to some methodology you have to at least have the belief that the methodology is useful. So you cannot do without beliefs at all. Susan Haack has jokingly referred to Popper as an atheist for his aversion to the concept of belief.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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Danny Frederick John Schoenemann I usually act not knowing whether my acion will be successful. Sometimes I act even hoping that it will not be. Your claim seems plainly false; and I guess it will seem so to everyone but you. You should take the time to stand back from your claims and try to refute them. You do not appear to offer any arguments. When you use words like 'so' it is merely to introduce a repetition of what you just said, as in your latest comment.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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John Schoenemann Danny Frederick, but you can only act if you doubt that your action will be successful if you are either in a hopeless situation or mentally ill. And what you do not doubt defines what you believe to be true.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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John Schoenemann Danny Frederick, my arguments are plain as day. If you hold on to one methodology rather than another you must believe that the methodology that you have chosen is superior for some reason. If you throw out the concept of belief, you throw out the concept of reasoned preference. After all 'reasoned preference' is just a euphemism for justified belief.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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Danny Frederick John Schoenemann Acting while doubting whether one's action will be successful is a normal situation. Have you even been to a job interview? Have you ever played a sport? Have you ever courted a woman (or man, if that is your preference)?
Actually, your arguments ARE plain as day. 'P, therefore P' is a valid argument form, though a degenerate one, because patently circular. I explained how a total sceptic can accept and act in accord with Popper's methodology, thereby showing the falsity of your claim that methodology presupposes belief. How do you respond? You say: "If you hold on to one methodology rather than another you must believe that the methodology that you have chosen is superior for some reason." A mere restatement of the proposition I just refuted. That is not rational debate.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него -
Joseph Podlesnik This is some thread! Interesting to see these ideas teased out.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него -
Skye Stewart Danny Frederick rather than beliefs, would you subscribe to “purpose”? It seems Critical Rationalists often are intent to make clear that their opinions are hypotheses, their beliefs are completely revisable, and their conjectures tentative. But under certain conditions everyone‘s are, so the belief and intent to make this propensity known to everyone I have always found interesting (and beneficial and useful). But I dong mean to over psychologist the demographic or community in question.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него -
Danny Frederick Skye Stewart I don't understand the question. Of course, we have purposes in adhering to a methodology, primarily, the purpose to promote the growth of knowledge. I was denying that adherence to a methodology entails us having particular beliefs. It is an important point because what Popper showed was how one could be a total sceptic, doubting where others believe, yet still acknowledge and contribute to the growth of knowledge.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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Skye Stewart Danny Frederick yes, so imagine if everyone said that they don’t have “beliefs”, they have “purposes”. A belief under the right conditions is a propensity. Every propensity has a directedness and therefore a purpose.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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Danny Frederick Skye Stewart I don't think so. First. it is not the case that a belief is a propensity. Beliefs are related to action only via the medium of other beliefs (the Duhem problem), other attitudes (likes, dislikes, etc.) and purposes (what the believer aims to achieve). One and the same belief can result in very different propensities depending on the other beliefs, attitudes and purposes it is combined with. A belief on its own determines no propensity at all. Perhaps you meant all of that when you said "under the right conditions"?
Second, every propensity is a propensity for something to happen, so in that sense a propensity has a directedness. But most things have propensities without having purposes at all. The plate I am holding has a propensity to fall if I let go of it; but it has no purpose. Or have you recently got into Aristotelian animism?Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него -
Skye Stewart Danny Frederick I’m not interested in propensities but rather beliefs as propensities. Are there beliefs that have no propensities under any conditions? Why can’t beliefs be called the propensities of a person?Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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Danny Frederick Skye Stewart I answered your second question in my last message. A person with belief B may have propensity P now and propensity not-P tomorrow, if some of his other beliefs change. This is just the Duhem problem. I think the answer to your first question is plainly 'no.' Any belief (so long as it is not self-contradictory) will imply that action A is best, for some action A, if it is combined with suitable other beliefs, attitudes and goals.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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Skye Stewart Danny Frederick yes, ceteris paribus, that is praxeologically or conceptually the case. We can only speak in terms of the conditions under which they apply. Whether physics or economics.
I’m having trouble thinking of a belief that is not a propensity under the conditions appropriate to it.Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него -
Danny Frederick Skye Stewart Wouldn't a contradictory one do? It will imply that action A is best but it will also imply that any action but A is best (because a contradiction implies everything). That would engender no propensity (because it engnders them all, so gives no clear direction).Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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Skye Stewart Danny Frederick is there not a literature by philosophers who conventionally argue that contradictory propositions cannot be simultaneous believed or sufficiently called a belief? If I say I believe i am standing in my house and not standing in my house simultaneously, I cannot be said to actually believe both on the conditions that would merit either.
Secondly, I would assume you have sympathy with Graham Priest’s dialetheism?Скрыть комментарий или пожаловаться на него
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