Justin Mallone поделился ссылкой в группе «critical rationalism».
The following excerpt argues that explanations are what is absolutely key in Popperian philosophy, and that Popper over-emphasizes the role of testing in science, but that this mistake was corrected by physicist and philosopher David Deutsch (see especially the discussion of the grass cure example). What do people think?
(excerpted from: https://curi.us/1504-the-most-important-improvement-to-popp…)
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Most ideas are criticized and rejected for being bad explanations. This is true even in science where they could be tested. Even most proposed scientific ideas are rejected, without testing, for being bad explanations.
Although tests are valuable, Popper's over-emphasis on testing mischaracterizes science and sets it further apart from philosophy than need be. In both science and abstract philosophy, most criticism revolves around good and bad explanations. It's largely the same epistemology. The possibility of empirical testing in science is a nice bonus, not a necessary part of creating knowledge.
In [The Fabric of Reality], David Deutsch gives this example: Consider the theory that eating grass cures colds. He says we can reject this theory without testing it.
He's right, isn't he? Should we hire a bunch of sick college students to eat grass? That would be silly. There is no explanation of how grass cures colds, so nothing worth testing. (Non-explanation is a common type of bad explanation!)
Narrow focus on testing -- especially as a substitute for support/justification -- is one of the major ways of misunderstanding Popperian philosophy. Deutsch's improvement shows how its importance is overrated and, besides being true, is better in keeping with the fallibilist spirit of Popper's thought (we don't need something "harder" or "more sciency" or whatever than critical argument!).
Here is (my summary, my words) the most important idea contributed to Popper's philosophy of science by someone other than Popper. It was contributed by David Deutsch in his book The Fabric of Reality:
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Luc Castelein I seem to remember that Bruce wrote something about this... It might be interesting to have a link...
УдалитьLuc Castelein I certainly hnave a problem with this: "epistemology should apply to all knowledge"... But then you don't see the difference between science and non-science? No problem of demarcation?
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Justin Mallone We can draw useful distinctions between science and non-science without those distinctions having to be rooted in some fundamental epistemological difference.
УдалитьLuc Castelein ???? So according to you this is of no importance:
УдалитьRichard Feynman discusses how we would…
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Elliot Temple The method of conjecture and refutation is universal for knowledge creation. Checking if stuff disagrees with experiment is a subset of the general method of criticism.
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Luc Castelein I mean this:
'I was, and still am, an empiricist of sorts, though certainly not a naive empiricist, who believes that “all knowledge stems from our perception or sense data”. My empiricism consisted in the view that, though all experience was theory-impregnated, it was experience which in the end could decide the fate of a theory, by knocking it out; and also in the view that only such theories which in principle were capable of being thus refuted merited to be counted among the theories of “empirical science”.'
Karl Popper, 'Replies To My Critics', can be found in 'The Philosophy of Karl Popper', ed. P.A. Schilpp.
Удалить'I was, and still am, an empiricist of sorts, though certainly not a naive empiricist, who believes that “all knowledge stems from our perception or sense data”. My empiricism consisted in the view that, though all experience was theory-impregnated, it was experience which in the end could decide the fate of a theory, by knocking it out; and also in the view that only such theories which in principle were capable of being thus refuted merited to be counted among the theories of “empirical science”.'
Karl Popper, 'Replies To My Critics', can be found in 'The Philosophy of Karl Popper', ed. P.A. Schilpp.
Bruce Caithness Why would one characterise a point of emphasis by a later student of Popper as a "mistake" by Popper?
УдалитьJustin Mallone I did not characterise "a point of emphasis by a later student of Popper" as a mistake by Popper. In my introduction to the quote, I (in summing up the content of the quote in my own words) characterized *Popper's overemphasis on the role of testing in science* as a mistake.
I did so because it was a mistake. The quote explains why: in both science and philosophy, explanations are fundamental to criticism. Testing is a useful and important thing, but it's possible to give useful and important things too much emphasis.
УдалитьI did so because it was a mistake. The quote explains why: in both science and philosophy, explanations are fundamental to criticism. Testing is a useful and important thing, but it's possible to give useful and important things too much emphasis.
Bruce Caithness Appendix 1 "The Bucket and The Searchlight" in "Objective Knowledge" 1972 is worth a pit stop. Mistake is a bit like "liar", a word to be used judiciously.
УдалитьBruce Caithness I do like Deutsch's "The Beginning of Infinity Explanations that Transform the World" (2011):
Explanation: Statement about what is there, what it does, and how and why.
Good/bad explanation: An explanation that is hard/easy to vary while still accounting for what it purports to account for.
For Popper, good political institutions are those that make it as easy as possible to detect whether a ruler or policy is a mistake, and to remove rulers or policies without violence when they are.
УдалитьExplanation: Statement about what is there, what it does, and how and why.
Good/bad explanation: An explanation that is hard/easy to vary while still accounting for what it purports to account for.
For Popper, good political institutions are those that make it as easy as possible to detect whether a ruler or policy is a mistake, and to remove rulers or policies without violence when they are.
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Phil Wood I've not read Deutsch's book, but, if we're going to talk about Popper's writings on the matter, note that he promoted the idea that hpotheses should be as unlikely as possible because they permit many more tests than ones which don't. Under this idea, having college students eat grass is a very unlikely hypothesis, but, if true, would generate all kinds of useful next hypotheses. I don't understand why a scientist making an educated guess about the proposed fertility of a conjecture therefore disqualifies falsification as a method. Just my sense, for what it's worth.
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Rafe Champion It is a misunderstanding because Popper saw testing as one of five forms of crit with crit of metaphysics arguably the most important because most fundamental.
УдалитьBruce Caithness Rafe Champion makes a serious point.
(1) Philosophical or metaphysical theories are analysed in their situation to assess the adequacy of the theory as a solution to a problem. "A theory is comprehensible and reasonable only in its relation to a givenproblem-situation, and it can be rationally discussed only by discussing this relation...if we look upon a theory as a proposed solution to a set of problems, then the theory immediately lends itself to critical discussion - even if it is non-empirical and irrefutable. For we can now ask questions such as, Does it solve the problem? Does it solve it better than other theories? Has it perhaps merely shifted the problem? Is the solution simple? Is it fruitful? Does it perhaps contradict other philosophical theories needed for solving other problems? Questions of this kind show that a critical discussion even of irrefutable theories may well be possible." (see p 199 Conjectures and Refutations)
(2) Logical and mathematical theories are tested by attempted refutation, especially by finding internal contradictions. Decisions in these cases tend to be accepted more often than not as final.
(3) Empirical (scientific) theories, are criticised in a variety of ways but observations (basic statements) are elevated in their role in the critical discussion, hence the notion of falsifiability. The avoidance of scrutiny of over-loved theories can remove the practitioner from the game of science e.g. by adding ad hoc extensions that do not improve the testability. Science, like the other activities, is a rule-governed critical discussion.
Удалить(1) Philosophical or metaphysical theories are analysed in their situation to assess the adequacy of the theory as a solution to a problem. "A theory is comprehensible and reasonable only in its relation to a givenproblem-situation, and it can be rationally discussed only by discussing this relation...if we look upon a theory as a proposed solution to a set of problems, then the theory immediately lends itself to critical discussion - even if it is non-empirical and irrefutable. For we can now ask questions such as, Does it solve the problem? Does it solve it better than other theories? Has it perhaps merely shifted the problem? Is the solution simple? Is it fruitful? Does it perhaps contradict other philosophical theories needed for solving other problems? Questions of this kind show that a critical discussion even of irrefutable theories may well be possible." (see p 199 Conjectures and Refutations)
(2) Logical and mathematical theories are tested by attempted refutation, especially by finding internal contradictions. Decisions in these cases tend to be accepted more often than not as final.
(3) Empirical (scientific) theories, are criticised in a variety of ways but observations (basic statements) are elevated in their role in the critical discussion, hence the notion of falsifiability. The avoidance of scrutiny of over-loved theories can remove the practitioner from the game of science e.g. by adding ad hoc extensions that do not improve the testability. Science, like the other activities, is a rule-governed critical discussion.
Elliot Temple You guys seem to be missing the point when you talk metaphysics. DD was saying that **even in science, when dealing with testable, empirical theories** you STILL usually don't test them. You aren't showing Popper saying that.
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Evan O'Leary Is all the non-test criticism of the form "easy to vary while explaining the explicanda, and so not a good explanation of that explicanda because those easy to vary parts also explain things we're not trying to explain"?
УдалитьBruce Caithness "The possibility of empirical testing in science is a nice bonus, not a necessary part of creating knowledge." Temple, as Woody Allen might have said that is a non-sequitor
My reading of Popper and Deutsch, after Popper, is that how knowledge is created is up for grabs, how it grows is by criticism of which empirical testing is but a very important sub-species.
УдалитьMy reading of Popper and Deutsch, after Popper, is that how knowledge is created is up for grabs, how it grows is by criticism of which empirical testing is but a very important sub-species.
Elliot Temple Bruce, I don't find your comments productive. How about you stop replying to stuff related to me? Or would you like to have a real debate about the issues, to a conclusion, where every issue is addressed, on a serious discussion forum with e.g. nested quoting?
УдалитьElliot Temple Evan, no, for example Mises' economic calculation argument doesn't take that form. Pick up pretty much any non-fiction book making arguments in any field and you will find arguments which don't involve empirical testing and also don't mention how easy/hard to vary something is.
УдалитьBruce Caithness An explanation may have the virtues of simplicity, predictive ability, consistency, fruitfulness, explanatory power, and overall cohesion with the rest of our beliefs and yet be false. I suppose it is one's prerogative to settle for such reasons but I also suspect that we are seeking explanations that actually account for what is there, what it does, and how and why and see virtue in not getting too excited about reasons for belief. At the least we can hold that good explanations are hard to vary while still explaining what we think they explain but even then there may be factors we have missed.
Tangentially, on another group I encountered a reference to Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry's "Philosophy of Pseudoscience" (2013) which refers to Laudan's 1983 paper "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem". It was implied that Laudan's criticisms make Popper's formulation of the demarcation problem superseded.
David Miller, from "Some Hard Questions for Critical Rationalism" (2011) crisply addresses the point that Popper's demarcation does solve problems, quite specific ones :
"The problem of demarcation is solved much as Popper solved it. This commendation may surprise those who are acquainted with such titles as ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’ (Laudan 1983) and ‘The Degeneration of Popper’s Theory of Demarcation’ (Grunbaum 1989), or the writings of Kuhn (1962) and Lakatos (1973, 1974). But like many others, the authors of these criticisms thoroughly mistake the crucial philosophical task that Popper intended a criterion of demarcation to perform. Its task is not to ‘distinguish scientific and non-scientific matters in a way which exhibits a surer epistemic warrant or evidential ground for science than for non-science’, which Laudan lays down as a minimal condition for ‘a philosophically significant demarcation’, nor is it ‘to explicate the paradigmatic usages of 'scientific'. Questions of sureness, warrant, and grounds, are of interest principally to justificationists who live in mighty dread that they may not be ‘entitled to believe any scientific theories’; questions of usage, classification, and status, are of interest principally to essentialists, to philosophers who prefer to pursue philosophy unphilosophically, and to educational administrators; and inevitably, of course, to lawyers. Contrary to what Grunbaum resolutely supposes, the problem of demarcation is only incidentally concerned to ratify the unscientific status of psychoanalytic theory (whatever psychoanalytic theory is taken to be),and contrary to what Lakatos likewise supposes, it is only incidentally concerned to ratify the scientific status of Newton’s theory (whatever Newton’s theory is taken to be)."
What then is the problem that for Popper demarcation is trying to solve?
"'It was, rather, an urgent practical problem: under what conditions is a critical appeal to experience possible - one that could bear some fruit?' (Popper) Here is a clear philosophical, even logical, problem: under what circumstances is an empirical investigation worth undertaking? The solution is also clear: since the formulation of a hypothesis, its acceptance as a candidate for the truth, must precede its consideration, the task of an empirical investigation cannot be to promote hypotheses, but only to demote them."
УдалитьTangentially, on another group I encountered a reference to Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry's "Philosophy of Pseudoscience" (2013) which refers to Laudan's 1983 paper "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem". It was implied that Laudan's criticisms make Popper's formulation of the demarcation problem superseded.
David Miller, from "Some Hard Questions for Critical Rationalism" (2011) crisply addresses the point that Popper's demarcation does solve problems, quite specific ones :
"The problem of demarcation is solved much as Popper solved it. This commendation may surprise those who are acquainted with such titles as ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’ (Laudan 1983) and ‘The Degeneration of Popper’s Theory of Demarcation’ (Grunbaum 1989), or the writings of Kuhn (1962) and Lakatos (1973, 1974). But like many others, the authors of these criticisms thoroughly mistake the crucial philosophical task that Popper intended a criterion of demarcation to perform. Its task is not to ‘distinguish scientific and non-scientific matters in a way which exhibits a surer epistemic warrant or evidential ground for science than for non-science’, which Laudan lays down as a minimal condition for ‘a philosophically significant demarcation’, nor is it ‘to explicate the paradigmatic usages of 'scientific'. Questions of sureness, warrant, and grounds, are of interest principally to justificationists who live in mighty dread that they may not be ‘entitled to believe any scientific theories’; questions of usage, classification, and status, are of interest principally to essentialists, to philosophers who prefer to pursue philosophy unphilosophically, and to educational administrators; and inevitably, of course, to lawyers. Contrary to what Grunbaum resolutely supposes, the problem of demarcation is only incidentally concerned to ratify the unscientific status of psychoanalytic theory (whatever psychoanalytic theory is taken to be),and contrary to what Lakatos likewise supposes, it is only incidentally concerned to ratify the scientific status of Newton’s theory (whatever Newton’s theory is taken to be)."
What then is the problem that for Popper demarcation is trying to solve?
"'It was, rather, an urgent practical problem: under what conditions is a critical appeal to experience possible - one that could bear some fruit?' (Popper) Here is a clear philosophical, even logical, problem: under what circumstances is an empirical investigation worth undertaking? The solution is also clear: since the formulation of a hypothesis, its acceptance as a candidate for the truth, must precede its consideration, the task of an empirical investigation cannot be to promote hypotheses, but only to demote them."
Evan O'Leary Interesting. Mises' economic calculation argument does take the form:
Government welfare can't do this part of the optimization problem we're trying to solve (as an attempted explanation of how to optimize efficiency, it seems not to account for the requires-local-knowledge explicanda)
Are there any criticisms that are not of that form or either of the two previously mentioned forms?
Those are DDs 3 criteria for a theory being problematic in The Logic of Experimental Tests
УдалитьGovernment welfare can't do this part of the optimization problem we're trying to solve (as an attempted explanation of how to optimize efficiency, it seems not to account for the requires-local-knowledge explicanda)
Are there any criticisms that are not of that form or either of the two previously mentioned forms?
Those are DDs 3 criteria for a theory being problematic in The Logic of Experimental Tests
Elliot Temple "Government welfare can't do this part of the optimization problem we're trying to solve (as an attempted explanation of how to optimize efficiency, it seems not to account for the requires-local-knowledge explicanda)" is not a statement of a form of an argument.
УдалитьElliot Temple Evan, if you want to have a serious discussion, why don't you post at a forum which supports quotes? You said you would do that in a couple days, and that was like a month ago, and you haven't. I don't know why you refuse to come discuss at a forum which supports detailed discussion, but then want to talk with me on facebook. i would understand if you wanted to talk to me or did not want to talk with me, either way, but i don't see the point of only talking at forums where it's very hard to discuss much.
УдалитьEvan O'Leary It's a form of a criticism; I'm trying to explain criticism and the possible forms of it people have come up with
I signed up my email; shouldn't I get emails from the discussion group or something?
УдалитьI signed up my email; shouldn't I get emails from the discussion group or something?
Elliot Temple Yes you should get emails. You can configure where you receive emails with your yahoo account, or you can sign up by email with no yahoo account.
УдалитьElliot Temple Regarding my blog, your posts there were answered and you didn't follow up on stuff.
УдалитьElliot Temple > It's a form of a criticism; I'm trying to explain criticism and the possible forms of it people have come up with
this would be easier to discuss if you used a quote instead of "it". i don't know what "it" is. is it the quote i gave? as i said that is not a *form* of an argument (or criticism). if you think it is, then i don't think you know what a "form" is.
Удалитьthis would be easier to discuss if you used a quote instead of "it". i don't know what "it" is. is it the quote i gave? as i said that is not a *form* of an argument (or criticism). if you think it is, then i don't think you know what a "form" is.
Evan O'Leary Oh, the first it is the form of mises' argument I described
УдалитьElliot Temple > *It* is criticism
So, substituting, you meant: "Criticism is a form of a criticism"
what?
i think you need to use a forum with quoting and then use quotes.
УдалитьSo, substituting, you meant: "Criticism is a form of a criticism"
what?
i think you need to use a forum with quoting and then use quotes.
Elliot Temple you follow up tons on facebook, but not on a forum where the discussion is productive.
УдалитьElliot Temple "[the form of mises' argument] is a form of a criticism". again, what? i think you should rewrite your text to be better instead of trying to fix it with patches.
УдалитьEvan O'Leary Yes, that's the correct interpretation. I'm trying to find out the forms of criticism people have created, and mises' argument is a criticism that I'll have to explain in order to find that out.
I'll use your discussion forum, but I still don't understand why it's better than Facebook. I can just use > quotes if I want to
УдалитьI'll use your discussion forum, but I still don't understand why it's better than Facebook. I can just use > quotes if I want to
Elliot Temple can branch topics as new top level posts (facebook supports that but the moderators here are pretty picky about top level posts)
УдалитьElliot Temple on facebook, no one expects anyone to follow up on old material, and actually think it's weird if you do.
УдалитьElliot Temple and no one expects facebook discussions to be serious, they often don't even try much
УдалитьElliot Temple the Likes help make facebook a popularity contest instead of truth-seeking
УдалитьElliot Temple facebook's culture is hostile to the open internet and the use of links as references. this includes the moderators here who have basically told me not to link too much external stuff.
УдалитьElliot Temple quite a few facebook users seem to have a problem with having their discussion contributions quoted. it's part of the general facebook atmosphere.
УдалитьElliot Temple facebook allows editing comments and doesn't show you what changed when viewing the edit history
УдалитьElliot Temple facebook allows deleting comments and doesn't show any history of those at all
УдалитьElliot Temple people routinely delete comments on facebook out of a discussion. the content here is unstable. just the other day, at this group, a comment was deleted after i replied to it and then my own reply didn't make sense b/c the context was gone.
УдалитьElliot Temple facebook doesn't allow anonymous or pseudonymous posting
УдалитьElliot Temple facebook gives a large visibility advantage to some content over other content, and therefore encourages ppl to write top level posts, or top-level comments instead of actually use the reply feature.
УдалитьElliot Temple The FI email group has well over 2000 DD posts in its history, shaping its discussion style, atmosphere and ethos. And has a variety of other good things in its history.
УдалитьElliot Temple The FI forum has evolved over more than 20 years, with a goal of facilitating serious truth-seeking discussion. Facebook doesn't have that goal or that history.
УдалитьElliot Temple FB's format is hostile to getting content off it into a usable format to reuse elsewhere
УдалитьElliot Temple writing this and getting a bunch of Likes spammed my notifications feed which would make it hard to use if i was getting other notifications i cared about.
УдалитьElliot Temple Oh yeah, FB has no way to search or browse comments by a particular author. This is AWFUL. HORRIFIC. TERRIBLE. I literally can't be like "Justin and Alan write good stuff, I want to read all their posts" and actually find that material.
УдалитьElliot Temple FB has no features for tracking read/unread (or flagging) like email does.
УдалитьElliot Temple FB doesn't let you choose your own software (for using it) like the web and email do. (You can easily interact with regular websites with software other than your browser, but not so much with app-in-a-browser stuff like FB.)
УдалитьLuc Castelein "Bruce, I don't find your comments productive. How about you stop replying to stuff related to me? "???? Most people here, including me, do find Bruce's comments interesting.
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Alan Forrester "But experimental testing is by no means the only process involved in the growth of scientific knowledge. The overwhelming majority of theories are rejected because they contain bad explanations, not because they fail experimental tests. We reject them without ever bothering to test them. " David Deutsch, "The Fabric of Reality", Chapter 1.
УдалитьLuc Castelein How can one interprete this as implying that testing is not important? If a test falsifies a theory, how can this not be important?
УдалитьLuc Castelein "There is indeed no such thing as "the" scientific method. A scientist uses a very great variety of exploratory stratagems, and although a scientist has a certain address to his problems – a certain way of going about things that is more likely to bring success than the gropings of an amateur – he uses no procedure of discovery that can be logically scripted. According to Popper's methodology, every recognition of a truth is preceded by an imaginative preconception of what the truth might be – by hypotheses such as William Whewell first called "happy guesses," until, as if recollecting that he was Master of Trinity, he wrote "felicitous strokes of inventive talent."
Most of the day-to-day business of science consists in making observations or experiments designed to find out whether this imagined world of our hypotheses corresponds to the real one. An act of imagination, a speculative adventure, thus underlies every improvement of natural knowledge.”
Peter Medawar, 'The Limits of Science'.
УдалитьMost of the day-to-day business of science consists in making observations or experiments designed to find out whether this imagined world of our hypotheses corresponds to the real one. An act of imagination, a speculative adventure, thus underlies every improvement of natural knowledge.”
Peter Medawar, 'The Limits of Science'.
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Bruce Caithness Deutsch as with other Popper scholars such as Agassi, Jarvie, Miller and so forth is to be applauded for expanding on particular problem areas, such as in this case the role of explanation. Factors listed by Popper in forming preferences between alternative theories include internal consistency in comparing conclusions, investigations of the logical forms of theories, comparing theories with other theories to determine whether or not the theory under consideration is a scientific advance, and empirical applications of the conclusions. I suspect Deutsch would regard a claim that Popper was "mistaken" as intemperate.
УдалитьElliot Temple Why are you trying to speak for Deutsch, while arguing with the person who has discussed Deutsch's views with Deutsch the most?
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Luc Castelein ???? Deutsch wrote books. Anybody who can read is supposed to be able in one way or another to understand what he wrote. This is extremely authoritarian...
УдалитьElliot Temple Bruce tried to speak DD on a matter which DD did not give a statement on in his books. He shouldn't speak for DD, as he recognized, especially when he isn't very familiar with DD and is talking to DD's close associates.
УдалитьElliot Temple Luc, calling my comments "extremely authoritarian" is an attack. For the second time, will you please leave me alone?
УдалитьLuc Castelein Well, it is authoritarian. What exactly do you suppose is the use of writing a book?
УдалитьLuc Castelein Why? The idea is if you post sthg here that all the members are allowed to criticize whatever you write. If everybody has to leave you alone, the what's the use of this?
УдалитьElliot Temple You aren't trying to write comments that I would appreciate, learn from, or benefit from. You aren't trying to have a serious debate to a conclusion. What's the point, other than to attack me and to signal to the audience?
УдалитьLuc Castelein I think it's neither productive nor intelligent to claim that you know the truth because you tend to discuss it with sbdy...
УдалитьElliot Temple I didn't claim that. Misrepresenting what I said – repeatedly even after I clarified – is part of your attack. Please stop.
УдалитьLuc Castelein "Why are you trying to speak for Deutsch, while arguing with the person who has discussed Deutsch's views with Deutsch the most?"????
УдалитьElliot Temple The thing is, even if I explain this to you, what do I gain from it? So how about you leave me alone?
УдалитьLuc Castelein You seem to imply that you know the truth of what Deutsch thinks. While whatever is in his books is no secret...
УдалитьElliot Temple You are reading between the lines and making up ideas I didn't say, and attributing them to me in order to attack them and me. Please stop and leave me alone.
УдалитьLuc Castelein What exactly was the point of that remark? Which problem did it solve?
УдалитьElliot Temple Bruce was mistaken to speak for Deutsch. He should stop. He recognized this and took it back.
УдалитьElliot Temple I didn't attempt to use DD's authority for my views. Bruce attempted to use DD's authority for his views. That was, in context, ridiculous.
УдалитьLuc Castelein Ok, where he writes "I suspect Deutsch would regard a claim that Popper was "mistaken" as intemperate."...
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Elliot Temple Bruce, can you either reply to my comment at https://www.facebook.com/.../permalink/10155734930704904/... or leave me alone?
УдалитьJustin Mallone поделился ссылкой в группе «critical rationalism».
The following excerpt argues that explanations are what is absolutely key in Popperian philosophy, and that Popper over-emphasizes the role of testing in science, but that this mistake was corrected by physicist and philosopher David Deutsch (see especially the discussion of the grass cure example). What do people think?
(excerpted from: https://curi.us/1504-the-most-important-improvement-to-popp…)
--------QUOTED MATERIAL STARTS BELOW HERE--------
Most ideas are criticized and rejected for being bad explanations. This is true even in science where they could be tested. Even most proposed scientific ideas are rejected, without testing, for being bad explanations.
Although tests are valuable, Popper's over-emphasis on testing mischaracterizes science and sets it further apart from philosophy than need be. In both science and abstract philosophy, most criticism revolves around good and bad explanations. It's largely the same epistemology. The possibility of empirical testing in science is a nice bonus, not a necessary part of creating knowledge.
In [The Fabric of Reality], David Deutsch gives this example: Consider the theory that eating grass cures colds. He says we can reject this theory without testing it.
He's right, isn't he? Should we hire a bunch of sick college students to eat grass? That would be silly. There is no explanation of how grass cures colds, so nothing worth testing. (Non-explanation is a common type of bad explanation!)
Narrow focus on testing -- especially as a substitute for support/justification -- is one of the major ways of misunderstanding Popperian philosophy. Deutsch's improvement shows how its importance is overrated and, besides being true, is better in keeping with the fallibilist spirit of Popper's thought (we don't need something "harder" or "more sciency" or whatever than critical argument!).
Here is (my summary, my words) the most important idea contributed to Popper's philosophy of science by someone other than Popper. It was contributed by David Deutsch in his book The Fabric of Reality:
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Tanny Clapsaddle Elliot Temple,
While I can't delve for quotes right now, I can say that Popper suggested we try to come up with the best theories we can (these include ones that on the face of it are "highly unlikely"), as opposed to, say, feeding every permutation of possible explanation into a computer and testing (which isn't to say this is possible).
Having said that, it remains true that some of our supposed "best theories" have turned out to be false, and some oddball theories have withstood tests better than established ones. The conclusion, however, isn't that due to our ignorance, all theories are true (for all we know); it's just that we lack the criterion to identify one as true. We may rule theoretical "long-stretches" because there isn't time nor money in the world to dream of testing them, but a few of them may be true after all...
While I can't delve for quotes right now, I can say that Popper suggested we try to come up with the best theories we can (these include ones that on the face of it are "highly unlikely"), as opposed to, say, feeding every permutation of possible explanation into a computer and testing (which isn't to say this is possible).
Having said that, it remains true that some of our supposed "best theories" have turned out to be false, and some oddball theories have withstood tests better than established ones. The conclusion, however, isn't that due to our ignorance, all theories are true (for all we know); it's just that we lack the criterion to identify one as true. We may rule theoretical "long-stretches" because there isn't time nor money in the world to dream of testing them, but a few of them may be true after all...
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Elliot Temple Why did you put the text "highly unlikely" and "long-stretches" in quote marks? I ask because I see this grammatical error commonly and I've been trying to find out why people do it.
Elliot Temple And "best theories".
Tanny Clapsaddle Elliot Temple,
It's not a grammatical error in CR. As you probably know from reading Popper and Miller, a theory isn't really "likely" or not, a "long stretch" or not, they just may appear to us that way. Likelihood is a subjective (and therefore irrelevant) false metric, since something is true or not. Likewise with best theories.
It's not a grammatical error in CR. As you probably know from reading Popper and Miller, a theory isn't really "likely" or not, a "long stretch" or not, they just may appear to us that way. Likelihood is a subjective (and therefore irrelevant) false metric, since something is true or not. Likewise with best theories.
Luc Castelein By "delving" I just found this from a booklet that I very much love:
“A scientific theory is not one which explains everything that can possibly happen: on the contrary, it rules out most of what could possibly happen, and is therefore itself ruled out if what it rules out happens. So a genuinely scientific theory places itself permanently at risk. (…) Falsifiability is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. The central point is that if all possible states of affairs fit in with a theory then no actual state of affairs, no observations, no experimental results, can be claimed as supporting evidence for it. There is no observable difference between its being true and its being false. So it conveys no scientific information. Only if some imaginable observation would refute it is it testable. And only if it is testable is it scientific.”
Bryan Magee, 'Popper' (the US-version of the booklet has the title 'Philosophy and the Real World: an Introduction to Karl Popper'). The booklet is a masterpiece.
“A scientific theory is not one which explains everything that can possibly happen: on the contrary, it rules out most of what could possibly happen, and is therefore itself ruled out if what it rules out happens. So a genuinely scientific theory places itself permanently at risk. (…) Falsifiability is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. The central point is that if all possible states of affairs fit in with a theory then no actual state of affairs, no observations, no experimental results, can be claimed as supporting evidence for it. There is no observable difference between its being true and its being false. So it conveys no scientific information. Only if some imaginable observation would refute it is it testable. And only if it is testable is it scientific.”
Bryan Magee, 'Popper' (the US-version of the booklet has the title 'Philosophy and the Real World: an Introduction to Karl Popper'). The booklet is a masterpiece.
Elliot Temple Tanny, what do you think those quotation marks mean?
Luc Castelein “There is no criterion of truth at our disposal, and this fact supports pessimism. But we do possess criteria which, if we are lucky, may allow us to recognize error and falsity. Clarity and distinctness are not criteria of truth, but such things as obscurity or confusion may indicate error. Similarly coherence cannot establish truth, but incoherence and inconsistency do establish falsehood. And, when they are recognized, our own errors provide the dim red lights which help us in groping our way out of the darkness of our cave.”
Karl Popper, 'Conjectures and Refutations'.
Karl Popper, 'Conjectures and Refutations'.
Tanny Clapsaddle Elliot Temple,
"what do you think those quotation marks mean?"
I don't have to guess what they mean, as I'm the person using them.
They mean only that I'm using them in the more or less standard sense, whereas the quotation marks indicate they're not really relevant (or correct for that matter; as I wrote, it would be strange to call a true theory a "long-shot"...).
"what do you think those quotation marks mean?"
I don't have to guess what they mean, as I'm the person using them.
They mean only that I'm using them in the more or less standard sense, whereas the quotation marks indicate they're not really relevant (or correct for that matter; as I wrote, it would be strange to call a true theory a "long-shot"...).
Elliot Temple Can you tell me which dictionary or other reference books says that quotation marks can be used to indicate "not really relevant"?
Tanny Clapsaddle Elliot Temple,
I thought the discussion was about whether mental rejection of hypotheses without testing represents an important improvement on Popper's epistemology or not (the affirmative connoting he didn't claim this). Whether or not I correctly used quotation marks (even after explaining why) strikes me as irrelevant to this issue.
I thought the discussion was about whether mental rejection of hypotheses without testing represents an important improvement on Popper's epistemology or not (the affirmative connoting he didn't claim this). Whether or not I correctly used quotation marks (even after explaining why) strikes me as irrelevant to this issue.
Elliot Temple I told you it was of interest to me and asked about it.
Tanny Clapsaddle Elliot Temple,
From CMoS 15, 7.58:
“Scare quotes.” Quotation marks are often used to alert readers that a term is used in a nonstandard, ironic, or other special sense. Nicknamed “scare quotes,” they imply, “This is not my term” or “This is not how the term is usually applied.”
From CMoS 15, 7.58:
“Scare quotes.” Quotation marks are often used to alert readers that a term is used in a nonstandard, ironic, or other special sense. Nicknamed “scare quotes,” they imply, “This is not my term” or “This is not how the term is usually applied.”
Elliot Temple Popper uses those terms without scare quotes.
Elliot Temple Which one of the options from the CMoS passage were you using?
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