If we take seriously the idea that scientific method consists of a collection of techniques, then we are ultimately driven to the conclusion that there must be far more than two methodologies, one for the physical sciences and one for the social sciences. In this respect, methodological dualism is ridiculous. If, however, we see scientific method an extension of morality to the criticism of theory, as Popper did, then we have to admit that what's good for the goose is good for the gander: the criticism of any theory, whether a theory about society or not, can and probably should be governed by the same set of rules. In that case, methodological monism, as proposed by Popper, is preferable to any sort of pluralism. The older view, according to which methodology consists of a collection of techniques, is actually a holdover from the heyday of logical positivism, a time during which positivists tried to reduce morality itself to a set of techniques for obtaining desired results. It was this constant, cheesy attempt to debunk anything and everything that most typified positivism in the early twentieth century, and it was opposition to this trend that most typified Popper's philosophy throughout his career. The often repeated idea that Popper himself was a positivist is utterly mistaken: he dealt so often with their problems not because he agreed with them but because he disagreed with them, and especially wanted to refute their views.